Location: 270 JCC
Computer security is traditionally about the protection of digital systems from adversaries such as criminals or governments. In this talk, I will explore interpersonal threat models, in which the adversary is a member of the victim's social circles---an intimate partner, family member, or other close acquaintance---and who seeks to cause harm to the victim, not just their technology. Such threat models are a widespread and increasingly severe problem, and their study opens up a new frontier for computer security research and practice.
This perspective has emerged from Ristenpart's research and advocacy in the context of interpersonal abuse contexts such as intimate partner violence (IPV) and human trafficking. We now have a body of research detailing the multifaceted and damaging ways in which abusers exploit technology to harass, impersonate, threaten, monitor, intimidate, and otherwise harm their target via spyware, social media, tracking tools, account compromise, and more. To make progress, Ristenpart takes an advocate-scientist approach that blends ongoing evidence-based design and delivery of clinics that directly assist survivors suffering tech abuse; systemic advocacy for new laws and policies; and basic research into how to design technology to improve its security in the face of interpersonal threats. The latter requires understanding and resolving complex tensions between interpersonal and traditional threat models. He will discuss a few examples of his group's recent research towards resolving these tensions in account security, location tracking technologies, and AI. The talk will include discussion of physical, sexual, and emotional violence.